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Abstract - Unlike the official view which ascribes the current crisis to some anomalies of the 
securitisation processes, and consistently proposes minor adjustments to the existing regulatory 
apparatus, our opinion is that we are facing the last episode of a string of crises originated by the 
structural evolution of the financial systems in the last decades. Adopting a systemic approach, we 
summarise this evolution in six critical points and show the necessity of a radical overhaul of the 
regulatory framework. A preliminary scheme of consistent regulatory measures is then proposed, 
aiming at an acceptable degree of systemic stability while reasserting the fundamental function of 
the financial sector of promoting private productive investments and innovation. 
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1.  Introduction 
While policy-makers are trying to impede the current crisis producing a deep and 
prolonged global recession, regulatory authorities are beginning to discuss the 
modifications to introduce to the current schemes of financial regulation and supervision in 
order to avert future repetitions of similar events. It is curious that, prompted by the 
seriousness and costs of the crisis, the authorities and the financial industry are offering 
rather homogeneous analyses of its causes and of remedies.
1 
The current financial structure is the result of a process that started some decades 
ago when the management of international imbalances was increasingly left into the hands 
of private finance. This required both a more generalised opening of the capital account of 
the balance of payments and a mix of deregulation, in effect a liberalisation, and re-
regulation of national financial systems. At that time the change was depicted as the 
passage from a structural to a prudential approach to financial regulation. Basically the 
new vision asserts that banks must be free to assume all types and amounts of risks they 
want at the condition that they hedge them; and that capital is the best way for hedging 
unexpected risks. For the banking sector the new approach has taken the form of the 
international standard produced by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
initially based on hedging only credit risks with a minimum risk-sensitive capitalisation. In 
particular, the USA progressively abandoned the defences built by the Glass-Steagall Act, 
complementing their previous bank supervisory process with Basel requirements, while 
leaving investment banks practically unregulated. As a result of a first experience with the 
application of what is now termed Basel I, market risk was later added for computing risk-
weighted assets. In 2004 a new framework was produced, termed Basel II, whose aim is to 
render capital requirements more sensitive to a wider set of risks. Accepting the advances 
made by financial modelling, Basel II tends to make regulatory capital converge to the 
economic capital computed using banks’ best practices. In Europe the new scheme has 
become effective starting from January 2008, while, before the current crisis erupted, the 
USA and other countries planned to adopt it in 2009 or later. 
The old and the new Capital Accord are built following a bottom up or micro-stability 
approach, according to which resilient single banks help to construct a resilient banking 
system. The BCBS is clear that its standard constitutes a necessary though not a sufficient 
condition to attain systemic resilience. The Core Principles for Effective Banking 
                                                  
1 See, for instance, CRMPG III (2008), EC (2008), Financial Stability Forum (2008a, 2008b), G20 
(2008), IIF (2008), IMF (2008).   2 
Supervision (BCBS 1997, 2006a, 2006b) state that a set of institutional and policy 
preconditions are necessary to render prudential regulation effective. In Minskyan terms, 
an effective systemic cushion of safety must complement micro-safety margins based on 
capitalisation. 
The response of international and national authorities to the current crisis contains 
proposals that do not envisage significant changes to the above design. In their view, 
financial crises always existed and we will have to live with them in the future. Their 
attention is focused on idiosyncratic aspects of the financial turmoil originated in the sub-
prime sector, with a generalisation that does not go beyond the securitisation processes. 
The design of the financial structure is considered as basically sound. At the international 
level, the re-direction of the IMF to primarily assume the role of global supervisor for the 
application of international standards and codes is reasserted and stressed.
2 As  for 
regulation, the adoption of Basel II must be hastened, although introducing some changes 
to cope with opacity and distorted incentives responsible for moral hazard and conflict of 
interests.  More severe stress tests should make capitalisation able to absorb shocks, 
while for liquidity requirements only some generic principle is for the moment offered. As it 
has been repeatedly asserted, e.g. by the President of the Financial Stability Forum, 
revisions of the current regulation must not interfere with market forces, particularly with 
their pursuit of financial innovations. 
From a theoretical standpoint the current regulatory approach might appears 
schizophrenic. On the one side, it follows ‘market fundamentalism’ leaving market forces 
free, equating competition and freedom, and taking the latter as the base for efficiency and 
long-term stability. On the other side, it follows the ‘market failure approach’ considering 
that rules on capitalisation are necessary to fill a gap on autonomous market decisions and 
producing with the Second Pillar of Basel II a sort of Manual to which good bankers should 
conform their risk management practices. However, these theoretical approaches have 
more common features than conflicting ones. In both cases the analyses are based on 
micro-partial models, which are essentially static and uncertainty-free. Macroeconomics 
has been reduced to the search for its micro-foundations, at best full of agency problems 
and moral hazard behaviours. It is only since the dangers posed by the current crisis were 
realised that the word ‘systemic’ is not being laughed at, as well as the disturbing notion 
that macro is not necessarily the sum of representative micros. The now much-cited, and 
often misquoted, Hyman Minsky was considered an eccentric, if not a charlatan. As for the 
                                                  
2  This and vague expressions on cooperation and increasing IMF’s lending capacity is all the 
Declaration of the November G-20’s Washington Summit (G-20, 2008) contains on international 
strategy.   3 
Basel scheme, the array of agency problems and moral hazard behaviours revealed by the 
current crisis, which push for introducing amendments to the New Accord, is a symptom 
that its approach is bended towards market fundamentalism. More important, however, is 
the nature of the advanced methodologies for credit, market and operational risks which 
the Basel Committee considers the long-term landing-place for all banks. These 
methodologies are essentially based on the hypotheses that markets are efficient and the 
so-called unexpected risks are measurable. The Basel Committee has derived these 
methodologies from what it considers the industry’s autonomous ‘best practices’ and 
fundamentally looks for regulatory capital to conform to the economic capital banks 
compute following those practices. The LTCM lection went unheard. 
Our opinion is that the current crisis is not specific: although the turmoil originated in 
the mortgage markets, the crisis is not a sub-prime one. Furthermore, too scant attention 
has been paid to the structural fragilities stemming from the international financial 
architecture. Starting from the observation that financial crises are becoming more 
frequent and violent, the first part of the paper tries to argue that their roots go deeper and 
have more common features than has been recognised by public authorities. Hence, an 
attempt is made to single out six main features responsible for the extreme fragility 
assumed by the financial sector. The second part of the paper builds on the previous 




2. The evolution of financial fragility in six points 
 
2.1 International structural disequilibria 
To understand the repetition of systemic, or potentially systemic, financial crises we have 
to trace its roots on the evolution of the international financial system, at least since 
the ’970s.  
The Bretton Woods Accord was borne with several serious limits: it was unipolar and 
asymmetric, non-systemic, i.e. thought for isolated imbalances, and able to treat only 
temporary balance of payment disequilibria. In short, its reference was a structurally static 
global economy. 
The world economy is, on the contrary, structurally dynamic. Uneven regional 
development and growth processes produce, also in a context of mature technologies, a   4 
re-design of the map of economic power and persistent balance of payment disequilibria.
3 
History shows how the repression of the endogenous tendency to economic multipolarity 
may lead to any sort of crises. The Second Post-War period saw the increasing 
emergence of a multipolar world economy, with new actors asking to redefine the 
distribution of value along the production chain, from inputs to intermediate and final goods 
and services. Balance of payment disequilibria coming from such processes are neither 
temporary nor idiosyncratic. An approach to solve those disequilibria should then be both 
systemic and oriented to medium-long term solutions. 
The breaking of the Bretton Woods system in the early ‘970s did not lead to re-design 
the public financial international architecture along multipolar lines. Instead, the private 
international finance was definitely charged with managing problems that were essentially 
public, and persistent balance of payment disequilibria came to be increasingly financed by 
means of private capital flows possessing high mobility and volatility.
4 In Minskyan terms, 
international finance produced speculative positions, easily escalating into ponzi ones. The 
ensuing fragility puts the system on the verge of crises every time large and non transitory 
balance of payments disequilibria emerge. 
This result worsens when clusters of technological innovations are considered. First, 
they tend to break previous equilibria, re-designing the map of relative national and 
international economic positions, with lasting consequences on balance of payment 
disequilibria. Second, as Carlota Perez shows in a book of some years ago (Perez 2002), 
periods of strong technological discontinuities lead finance to emerge as the dominant 
actor, normally accompanied by booms and busts.
5 
In the last decades these two quantitative and technological dynamics were present, 
with their interaction amplifying global financial fragility. Past crises as well as the current 
one must necessarily be considered inside this international picture. When it is stated that 
in the last period the international economy was awash with liquidity, it should be specified 
that persistent balance of payments disequilibria pose liquidity problems as far as they are 
predominantly managed by private intermediaries and markets. 
 
2.2 The financial pyramid and liquidity 
The financial evolution of the last three decades produced an impressive global increase of 
financial deepening. Measured in terms of GDP, a huge pyramid of financial instruments 
                                                  
3 With persistent imbalances we intend balance of payment current account disequilibria computed 
with reference to sustainable social and political conditions. 
4 On these processes see Cornfold and Kregel (1996) and Kregel (2004), (2008a), (2008b). 
5 See also Burlamaqui and Kregel (2004).   5 
has been built over a reduced primary and secondary liquidity base, producing a financial 
multiplier, or leverage, of an enormous magnitude.
6  
Ordering the layers of the financial pyramid in terms of decreasing qualities of 
liquidity,
7 we have: central bank’s liabilities, treasury bonds, commercial banks’ liabilities, 
private securities and finally derivatives (particularly those traded in OTC markets). The 
point is that the layers that experienced the most rapid growth are the ones whose liquidity 
is of a lower systemic quality, given its dependence on market volatility. Furthermore, more 
fragile Minskyan positions gather in those layers. As we witness during a financial turmoil, 
flight to quality means flight to liquidity of a higher order. Hence we have an upward 
pressure to produce enormous layers of liquidity of an inferior quality during periods of 
bonanza, whose cumulated fragility inevitably leads to ruinous portfolios’ unbundling, or 
deleveraging.  
The current system has no defence against huge increases of the financial multiplier 
and its sudden busts. Nor any institutional changes have been adopted to structurally 
enhance the ability of the layers of better quality to sustain the violent increases of the 
demand for it coming from the deflation of the other layers. On the contrary, the belief that 
central banks must pursue inflation targeting policies and governments must contain their 
deficits has been reinforced, thus slowing down policy reactions. Furthermore, the huge 
size reached by the more volatile part of the pyramid puts enormous strains on public 
resources and makes emergency public policies less effective. 
The recent evolution of financial systems also polluted an important slice of the better 
layers of liquidity. The increased contiguity between banks and markets has increased the 
share of banks’ assets and liabilities that depends on market liquidity, thus subjecting the 
whole banking system and their traditional liabilities to increased funding liquidity risks. 
Furthermore, the practical disappearance of liquidity requirements and the inefficacy of 
minimum capital requirements have significantly increased banks’ leverage measured with 
reference to un-weighted assets. Banks then actively participate to inflate the financial 
multiplier and to deleveraging. 
 
2.3 The financial pyramid and debt 
The increase of financial deepening has been based on the growth of indebtedness by non 
financial sectors, such as households. The softening of liquidity constraints was lifted by 
                                                  
6 For the effects of the evolution of the last decades on financial deepening see Borio (2007) and 
Schinasi (2007). 
7 We follow the definition of liquidity in terms of value, probability and time.   6 
financial innovations; however, its roots are to be found in the endogenous push to 
financial growth unleashed by the liberalisation of the financial sector.  
For simplicity let’s distinguish between the maximum potential growth permitted by the 
financial sector (FG) and the sustainable growth coming from real conditions (RG). Freed 
from liquidity requirements and eluding capital regulation, financial intermediaries have 
been able to strengthen their quest for value, thus enhancing the potential rate of organic 
growth of the whole financial sector. An FG higher than RG raises the question if it can 
permanently lift RG enough to equilibrate the two. The point is that the increase of the real 
growth potential requires stressing the ability of the financial system not just to choose a 
correct allocation of resources; it should also unrealistically push for the continuous 
creation of new winning innovations in the real sector at a pace determined by its potential. 
In these conditions a disequilibrium between FG and RG normally results. A solution is 
weakening the liquidity constraint of the non financial sector, thus pushing aggregate 
demand and debt. 
This process cannot go on indefinitely since the increasing burden of debt service 
subtracts resources to the dynamics of the aggregate demand and, in Minskyan terms, 
lowers the safety margins of the indebted units. Their fragility increases, up to multiply the 
importance of ponzi positions. When many units reach the point where current cash flows 
are insufficient for debt servicing, and are obliged to refinance their position with new debt, 
debt assumes an autonomous upward dynamics. The entire economy becomes more 
sensitive to financial conditions. A highly indebted economy, full of weak speculative and 
ponzi positions, structurally requires low interest rates; when they become lower than the 
ones consistent with ‘sound’ monetary policies further fragilities are added to the system. 
Eventually the entire enhanced growth process comes to a halt creating the 
conditions for a debt deflation. Since repositioning the system on a stable and sustainable 
path of indebtedness takes time, the probability of long periods of debt deflation increases. 
In Minsky’s terminology, it is the financial system’s success in terms of its high 
profitability that increases the fragility of the entire system. Phases of leveraging and 
deleveraging may then be red as periods of over-lending and sub-lending characterised by 
systemic risk mispricing.  
 
2.4 Capital contiguity 
Capital contiguity is an old phenomenon, especially in  countries at a low stage of 
development. In these countries wealth concentration often leads to cross-ownership 
between the real and financial sector, so that when a financial crisis hits it becomes difficult 
to find strong shareholders able to refinance banks. This is also why foreign direct financial   7 
capital is seen as helping to strengthen the financial sector.
8  In many case public 
intervention is called for, being the only source of non contiguous capital. 
The same effect comes from the dissemination of financial instruments whose risks 
are maintained at an idiosyncratic level as far as their amount remains contained. This is 
particularly the case for derivative instruments traded among financial operators, offering 
them insurance against market, credit and counterparty risks. Their dissemination 
produces an extreme correlation of portfolios, with the impossibility to honour these 
contracts in case of negative systemic events. In this context counterparty risk becomes a 
leading player. The principle is simple and well-known: a system cannot insure itself. 
Furthermore, while the shift and dissemination of financial risks outside the financial 
sector is normally considered as strengthening its resilience, it also increases the 
contiguity of capital among the various actors of the economy. In other terms, the 
dissemination of financial instruments for risk transfer and risk mitigation enhances the 
fluidity of the economy in good times, but increasingly builds into a systemic threat.
9 We 
have, therefore, a further case of systemic risk mispricing. 
 
2.5 Systemic dimension of financial intermediaries 
For a long period the extent and consequences of the too-big-to-fail problem were not fully 
realised. The systemic threat is posed not just by each single large institution but by a 
cluster of closely interconnected large ones. 
The enormous increase of their size and complexity was eased by their international 
role (see point 1) and supported by some piece of theory according to which large size 
leads to efficiency, which in turn is a necessary condition for long-term stability. This 
approach also served to strengthen forbearance by weak anti-trust authorities, especially 
when M&As are used to save failing banks. The ignorance on risk concentration now 
expressed by supervisors and policy-makers is then overplayed. 
The ‘980s foreign debt crisis should have alerted on the danger posed by the 
common exposure to risks by few large international banks. From that episode the right 
lesson was not learned. The only material result was the Basel Capital Accord, which 
afterwards resulted completely ineffective to prevent further systemic crises. In the 
following years the size of international institutions have exploded, while their micro-
justifications were vanishing as financial innovations came to permit scale and scope 
                                                  
8 However, the current crisis shows that foreign banks may also export their fragilities. 
9 These instruments and mitigation techniques are now being criticised for the opacity that long 
chains of risk transfer produce on the understanding of where risks go and how much they are 
concentrated. This is relevant for contagion; it is, however, the impossibility of endogenous systemic 
hedging that is at the heart of many current problems.   8 
economies at much lower volumes of activity, and an increasing number of studies have 
shown that diseconomies of scale are now clearly present. 
Finally, Basel regulatory standards, especially when complemented with fair value 
accounting, add to instability by dictating common and risk-sensitive reactions to the same 
events. 
 
2.6 Regulation based on liberalisation, capitalisation and risk measurement 
As we said in the Introduction, the logic behind the current regulatory approach is that 
intermediaries, banks in particular, should be free to take all types and quantities of risks 
they want as far as these risks are properly hedged. While anticipated losses may be 
hedged by provisions, unanticipated ones find their proper cushion in capitalisation. As 
Merton concisely puts it: 
 
The management of risk has traditionally focussed on capital. Equity capital is the 
‘cushion’ for absorbing risks of the institution. It is a wonderful, all-purpose cushion. 
Why? Because management need not know what the source of the unanticipated loss 
is. They do not have to predict the source of the loss, because equity protects the firm 
against all form of risk; it is in that sense an all-purpose cushion and thus it is very 
attractive for managing risk. As we all know, equity capital also can be quite expensive 
for exactly that reason. One can formally employ theories of agency costs, taxation 
and so forth to supply reasons why equity financing can be expensive. (R. Merton, 
1995, p.464). 
 
Although we “need not know what the source of the unanticipated loss is”, we must 
be able to measure, or more precisely to estimate, its underlying risks. In addition, since 
capital is “quite expensive”, we cannot expect that capitalisation may reach the level 
required to cover really extreme events. It follows that such a regulatory approach cannot 
be calibrated to effectively hedge systemic events. Its bottom-up, or micro-stability, 
approach may then be effective for cushioning the banking system in normal times, i.e. 
under conditions of restricted macroeconomic instability. Other and more general 
conditions are necessary to protect the financial system from being subject to excessive 
fluctuations, whose downward severity easily wipes out any affordable amount of capital.  
That is precisely the route taken by the Basel Accords, which adopt a bottom-up 
approach, do not limit risk-bearing, are based on capitalisation and explicitly require the 
existence of systemic preconditions to make them effective (Core Principles). In particular, 
Basel II: 
- Tends to make regulatory capital to converge to the economic capital that banks compute 
utilising industry’s best risk practises. 
- Consequently accepts an approach based on ‘fine tuning’ estimations of risks.   9 
- Adopts a Value at Risk methodology, which in practice smoothes the occurrence and 
severity of systemic events. 
The Basel’s construction rests on several critical points. 
First, its micro-stability approach puts heavy responsibilities for systemic protection on 
a series of preconditions. Some of these preconditions should play a pre-emptive role, 
especially the ones based on institutional features; the others, mainly safety nets and fiscal 
and monetary policies, should produce a systemic cushion capable of absorbing and 
smoothing excesses of instability hitting the financial and real systems. However, the 
institutional preconditions singled out by the Core Principles are meant to easy the working 
of a liberalised financial system, not to impede its endogenous excesses, which may on 
the contrary be left freer to operate. Policy and safety nets preconditions are not capable to 
prevent endogenous systemic crises and, as we have argued above, are severely tested 
when negative systemic events appear. A high instability, with its large and sudden call on 
liquidity and virulent financial and real contagions, seriously strains the resources of safety 
nets, central banks and governments, up to the point that even the more advanced 
economies are finding it hard to cope with them. This division of responsibilities between 
supervisors and policy makers then produce a void in the required systemic cushion, so 
that we may expect this sort of regulation to be at best effective in normal times. As we 
have shown elsewhere (Montanaro and Tonveronachi 2008b), calls by policy makers for 
more severe standards applied by supervisors are not justified if they mean that Basel’s 
Second Pillar should assume a macro-stability role. 
Second, in a liberalised financial system, where intermediaries are free to assume 
and endogenously create all the risk they like, it is highly questionable that an effective 
regulatory scheme may be built on a fine tuning approach to risks. The techniques 
employed for estimating risks de facto assume the existence of a sort of invariable 
mathematical generator, whose output, although complex, may be in time understood and 
future events foreseen with a high degree of confidence.
10 If, on the contrary and partly 
due to endogenous forces, the generator shifts in time to configurations that produce 
different and unexpected wave structures, the information content of the past becomes a 
poor guide for the future.
11 When changes reach, especially in a rather short period, a 
critical level, quantitative statistical estimations come to be the base for significant risk 
mispricing. Public authorities have no superior knowledge about the shifting generator; 
hence their own action follows what, without humour, we call market sentiment. Such 
distortions are likely to increase when supervisors, adopting Basel II’s approach, are 
                                                  
10 This image has been suggested by the paper of Taleb and Pilpel (2004). 
11 See also Daníelsson and Shin (2002) and Daníelsson (2008).   10  
obliged to follow the industry along the risk-shifting and risk-mitigation chain, which 
requires at each step a fine tuning estimation of risks. The multiplication of de-structured 
and re-structured products increases the probability of mispricing, especially for tailored 
instruments whose value is not checked in secondary markets. Again, the regulatory 
structure appears to be effective when all is going well, i.e. when it is less necessary. In 
reality, this regulatory system should require extreme systemic events not to occur or 
being foreseen well in advance; unfortunately this is not what reality is showing with 
increasing force since at least four decades. 
Third, although systemic liquidity problems have recently shown their full force, they 
find no equal status with the risks dealt with in Pillar I, and the indications we have so far 
on the revision of their regulatory treatment seem to follow the usual bottom up approach 
accompanied by stress testing. No fresh reflexions are coming on the pyramid of liquidity. 
The concentration of recent official recommendations on more severe stress tests 
makes it plain the fragility of the entire regulatory structure. Following the micro-stability 
approach and adding buffers to buffers, the result is increasing regulatory costs without 
rendering banks systemically resilient: systemic crises wipe-out any reasonable amount of 
capital and any micro-designed liquidity buffer. If we agree with the arguments developed 
in the previous points, a serious inconsistency appears from supervision applying rising, 
distorted and ineffective regulatory costs to tackle situations whose seriousness is 




3. A new international financial architecture 
Profound changes in the organisation of international financial relations should be at the 
forefront of proposals aimed at making national and global financial systems more resilient. 
A new approach is badly needed after having experienced the fallacies of laissez-faire 
international capital allocation models and the extreme damages produced by the private 
management of international funds.
12 Structural balance of payments disequilibria have to 
be met with structural financing, which cannot be private. 
Participants at an eventual Bretton Woods II should stick to the physiology of 
international financial relations, i.e. to financing international trade and direct foreign 
investments. The capital and financial account of the balance of payment should be left 
open for only these items, with limits given by conditions of long-term sustainability of 
                                                  
12 For a discussion of the post-war experience and of alternative solutions to global imbalances, see 
Cornfold and Kregel (1996).   11  
foreign debt. This requires multilateral public international institutions assuming not just the 
role of the international lender of last resort, but of lender of first resort for non transitory 
imbalances that should be linked to medium- or long-term conditionalities. 
The IMF and World Bank should stop adopting standards and codes produced by 
external institutions, such as the Basel Committee, IOSCO, IASB, etc., when playing their 
recently invented role as international public rating agencies.
13 All these standards suffer 
from being based on a micro-stability and not coordinated approach and linked to a 
laissez-faire conception of national and global financial systems.
14 
In the proposed new context these institutions should be given a real multilateral 
governance, be enforced with powers to assess and sanction also too-big-to-be-monitored 
countries (such as the USA), take a global long-term perspective, and also working as 
public international development banks. 
The alternatives to this approach are leaving substantially things as they stand, or 
retreating into regional competing blocks, each with its own IMF and WB. The first 
alternative will go on producing more frequent and violent global systemic crises. The 
second alternative does not solve problems of global inconsistencies and could easily 
escalate into a new form of beggar thy neighbour, although it could be thought as a 
starting point for a true global solution. 
We are well aware of the political difficulties that a radical solution along the previous 
lines will encounter, not least for the enormous damage it would inflict to private interests, 
especially those of large financial intermediaries. Their size, status and returns would 
receive a strong blow. The system designed on their freedom of action was repeatedly 
given its chance, and it failed. We must image what a Vegan observer would think of 
countries and regions left to the mercy of the vagaries of such private interests, ready to 
become social costs, even miseries. As economists we have the duty to look for solutions 
that better the well-being of societies, leaving to politicians the responsibility of choice. 
Each category is open to errors. However, it is high time that also academics and 
professional journals were evaluated according to a social impact factor. 
 
 
4. From a risk-measurement to a risk-control approach to financial regulation 
Although a solution for the international management of financial flows is critical for 
attaining a higher global resilience, a set of measures of national financial regulations, 
                                                  
13 We refer to the Financial Stability Assessment Program jointly coordinated by the IMF and World 
Bank. 
14 A discussion of these problems may be found in Montanaro and Tonveronachi (2008a)   12  
alternative to the existing ones, may be useful per se. Thought to be consistent with the 
international arrangements sketched above, they may be, however, independently 
implemented. 
From the previous synthetic analysis we derive that radical changes have to be 
made to the engine of the financial vehicle, not just some patches in its shock absorbers. A 
new perspective must be taken where: 
- The financial system must go back to its fundamental role, i.e. to allocate financial 
resources to the economy. A casino style financial system, creating paper value just to 
force changes in wealth distribution inside and outside it, with systemic distortions in 
resource allocation, enhanced fragility and frequent bubbles and busts, represents a net 
cost for the economy. From a social perspective let’s for example think to the effects it 
creates for social welfare nets, increasingly based on private financial instruments. This 
means reverting financial deepening to functional and sustainable dimensions and 
cleansing the financial pyramid of the dominance of fragile forms of liquidity. 
- Financial regulation must be designed to be effective to contain the force, frequency and 
social costs of systemic crises without relying upon imaginary strong systemic 
preconditions. 
- If some types of risks are ‘hard to value’, pose systemic threats and no micro-hedging is 
effective to contain their consequences, simply they must not be created, or in any case it 
must be impeded their transformation into systemic ones. In other terms, risks must be 
restricted to typologies and levels that can be managed at the micro-level (intermediaries), 
and monitored and contained at a systemic level (authorities). This means that structural 
regulatory measures must be reinserted in our tool box and that we must shift from a risk 
measurement-based regulation to one based on risk-control. 
- Regulation must profoundly revise its incentives and forbearances in order to contain the 
size of financial intermediaries within functional and non systemic limits. Furthermore, if 
different intermediaries are borne to perform different functions (banks, pension funds, 
insurance companies, etc.) they should be guided to adopt distinct strategies and policies, 
not to herd on homogeneous short-term reactions, often the result of regulation obliging to 
follow unreliable external ratings. 
In what follows we try to put forward some very preliminary proposals for re-regulating 
leveraged intermediaries. They are just intended to show the direction that the above 
proposed new perspective could take for a regulatory scheme alternative to the Basel one. 
Furthermore, for the moment these proposals do not cover non-leveraged financial 
intermediaries. 
   13  
4.1 Re-regulating financial intermediaries 
Definitions 
- Leveraged institutions are intermediaries collecting debt of any sort. 
- Upper Tier 1 capital is equity capital plus disclosed reserves. 
- Free capital is Upper Tier 1 capital net of fixed assets. 
- Leverage is defined as the ratio of un-weighted assets to free capital. 
- Liquidity requirements refer to cash and public debt with sovereign risk not higher than 
the home country’s one, marked to market. 
- The size of an intermediary is defined in terms of the value of total assets 
- The customer funding gap is defined as (Loans – Retail deposits)/Loans 
 
General rules 
- All leveraged institutions are regulated according to the common rules here proposed, 
although different quantitative requirements for capital and liquidity may be used in order to 
give intermediaries incentives consistent with their basic functions. 
- The capital and liquidity requirements must be observed both on a stand alone and 
consolidated basis. 
- Regulated institutions are forbidden any type of direct or indirect relation with countries 
whose institutions and markets do not possess a regulation homogenous with their own. 
- Non financial firms, directly or through their financial divisions, cannot operate in the 
fields proper of investment firms, banks and other financial intermediaries. 
- Non-insurance financial companies may only distribute insurance products, pension 
funds included. 
- Regulated institutions are not allowed to enter into securities and derivative contracts not 
traded in organised secondary markets. 
-  Derivatives, contingent liabilities and commitments are not allowed to be registered as 
off-balance sheet items. 
 
Capitalisation 
- A maximum leverage ratio is imposed. 
- Maximum leverage requirements are established in relation to categories of 
intermediaries defined in terms of size intervals. Larger the size, lower the maximum 
permitted leverage ratio. 
 
Liquidity 
- Coefficients to limit maturity mismatches are introduced.   14  
- Different liquidity requirements are introduced for the banking and the trading book. 
- For the banking book the liquidity requirement is an increasing function of the customer 
funding gap. 
- For the trading book the liquidity requirement is an increasing function of portfolio’s 
market value. 
- For both the banking and trading book, liquidity requirements must be consistent with 
systemic events. 
- The above liquidity requirements take the form of reserves deposited at the central bank. 
These reserves cannot be mobilised and, when in the form of cash, are remunerated in 
accordance to the deposit facility rate decided by the monetary authority. 
 
Other measures for smoothing pro-cyclicality 
- Dynamic provisions are introduced as a direct function of net income. 
- Fair value accounting is applied neither to the banking nor to the trading book. The 
trading book is marked to market. A specific Reserve for Trading Losses, not eligible as 




- Savings in capital, liquidity and provisions requirements coming from risk transfer is 
admitted only when all risks are integrally shifted to unconnected subjects. Securitisation 
leads to save capital only if no residual risk remains and no new obligations are linked to it.  
- Risk mitigation contracts do not lead to changes in capital, liquidity and provisions 
requirements. 
- The direct or indirect participation of non-financial entities into the capital of financial firms 
is not allowed, and vice versa. 
 
4.2 Re-regulating markets 
- The supervisory authority must oblige securities and derivatives markets to adopt strict 
standards on transparency such as to exclude from negotiation hard-to-value instruments. 
- Market operators are not allowed to possess ownership stakes in organised markets. 
- Minimum percentages for haircuts and margin requirements must be observed, at levels 
consistent with extreme historical market volatility. 
 
 
   15  
5. Comments on the above proposal 
When compared to Basel II, the above proposal is disarmingly simple for intermediaries to 
implement and supervisors to monitor. Regulatory and supervisory costs are minimised, 
whilst they constitute a big problem for the Basel construction. 
  The overall character of the previous proposal is to complement structural and 
prudential measures. Summing up: 
- Comprising all leveraged institutions, the present proposal tends to eliminate regulatory 
arbitrages, and any form of ‘shadow banking’. 
- As a minimum international standard, the required homogeneity among related financial 
systems isolates off-shore centres. 
- Regulated institutions are compelled to work on regulated markets. 
- Strong incentives go against high levels of financial deepening. 
- Strong incentives go against large financial dimensions. 
- Intermediaries and markets are forbidden to deal with hard-to-value financial instruments. 
-  Regulatory outsourcing is not accepted. 
- Separation of financial intermediation and commerce must be assured. 
- Capital contiguity is minimised. 
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